Skip to learning path
UES University of El Segundo FIELD STUDY / 2026 → 2027

Open learning · beginner through advanced

Prediction
markets
superstudy.

Learn to forecast carefully, read the contract, and test your assumptions. Twelve lessons, paper exercises, and a dated map of a changing market.

Free and self-paced. UES is unaccredited. Quizzes are learning checks, not a certification. All numerical examples are invented; this course is educational, not personal financial or legal advice.

Belief, price and outcome are different thingsAn original diagram shows uncertain beliefs flowing through a priced contract to one final outcome. Neither price nor belief guarantees that outcome. 60%BELIEF YES / $1if resolved YES NO / $0if resolved NO BELIEF ≠ PRICE ≠ OUTCOMESynthetic $1 binary contract
Probability is a statement about uncertainty. A market price is a transaction under particular rules.

01 / Learn in layers

A serious foundation.

Start with lessons 01–04. Continue through mechanics and research in 05–08, then advanced architecture, perpetuals, dated venue evidence and scenarios in 09–12. Each lesson ends with something you can do on paper.

  1. 01What an event contract actually paysBeginner · 30 min
  2. 02Base rates, evidence, and BayesBeginner · 40 min
  3. 03Forecast journals, calibration, and Brier scoresBeginner · 40 min
  4. 04Read the contract before forecasting itBeginner · 45 min
  5. 05Spreads, depth, fees, slippage, and expected valueIntermediate · 55 min
  6. 06Correlation, drawdowns, and the limits of KellyIntermediate · 60 min
  7. 07Strategy hypotheses and honest backtestsIntermediate · 60 min
  8. 08Market integrity, insider restrictions, and data ethicsIntermediate · 45 min
  9. 09Advanced execution architecture, simulated onlyAdvanced · 65 min
  10. 10Perpetuals: funding, leverage, and liquidation stressAdvanced · 65 min
  11. 11Read the 2026 landscape with an evidence matrixAdvanced · 50 min
  12. 12Conditional 2027 scenarios and a capstoneAdvanced · 70 min
01Beginner · about 30 minutes

What an event contract actually pays

  • Translate a synthetic binary contract into a cash-flow table.
  • Distinguish a probability estimate, a quoted price, and a realized outcome.
  • Separate event contracts from perpetual derivatives and separate access from permission.

Begin with the payoff, not the headline. In this course a synthetic YES unit costs a stated amount now and pays $1 if a precisely defined event resolves YES, or $0 if it resolves NO. This is a teaching convention; real contracts can have different settlement rules, fees, cancellations, and remedies. Owning the YES side does not guarantee that the popular interpretation of a headline will be the event that actually settles.

A price of $0.60 can be a useful starting point for discussing a 60% probability, but it is not proof of that probability. Fees, spreads, risk preferences, position constraints, limited participation, and scarce liquidity can all create a gap between a quote and an aggregate belief. A last trade is historical; an ask is a price someone is offering; your own probability is a forecast that can be wrong. These three objects should have different labels in a paper journal.

An event contract resolves under a rulebook. A perpetual derivative generally tracks an underlying exposure without a fixed expiry and can involve margin, funding, and forced liquidation. Neither an advertisement nor an API endpoint establishes that a particular person in California can access a particular product. Keep four independent checkboxes: what the product is, what the contract permits, what current law and regulator records say, and whether the account holder meets current eligibility requirements.

Your paper exercise

Build a payoff card

  1. Invent one binary event, a $1 YES payoff, a price, and a quantity. Label every value synthetic.
  2. Write initial cash paid, cash received under YES, cash received under NO, and the net for each outcome.
  3. Add a personal probability assumption and calculate expected net. Then raise the assumed ask by $0.05 and repeat.
  4. List what you would still need to verify before this could describe a real contract: rules, settlement source, fees, access, and legal and contractual permissions. Do not create an account or order.
Learning check: What does an advertised price or working API establish about an individual's legal eligibility?

02Beginner · about 40 minutes

Base rates, evidence, and Bayes

  • Choose a relevant reference class before reacting to a vivid signal.
  • Distinguish P(evidence | event) from P(event | evidence).
  • Update a prior using explicit likelihood assumptions and test sensitivity.

A base rate is the frequency of an event in a relevant reference class. The difficult part is choosing a class that is comparable to the present situation: similar definitions, incentives, observation windows, and data quality. A striking anecdote does not erase a base rate. Begin a forecast with the class, the sample size, the uncertainty, and the reasons the current case might differ.

Bayes' rule is P(H | E) = P(H)P(E | H) / [P(H)P(E | H) + (1 - P(H))P(E | not H)]. The probability that a signal appears when an event is true is not the probability that the event is true after seeing the signal. Both the true-signal rate and the false-signal rate matter. If the evidence has zero probability under both possibilities, the supplied model cannot update; the posterior is undefined.

Likelihood inputs are often estimates rather than measured constants. Report a range when the signal quality is uncertain, and avoid counting the same evidence twice. Two articles repeating one source are not two independent confirmations. When evidence arrives over time, document the information available at each update so a later result cannot silently rewrite the earlier forecast.

Your paper exercise

Write an evidence ledger

  1. Choose a synthetic prior and record the reference class that would justify it.
  2. Enter hypothetical true-signal and false-signal likelihoods into the Bayes calculator.
  3. Change each likelihood across a plausible assumed range and record how much the posterior moves.
  4. Describe one pair of signals that shares a source and explain why treating them as independent would overstate confidence.
Learning check: With a 20% prior, 80% true-signal rate, and 10% false-signal rate, what is the updated probability?

03Beginner · about 40 minutes

Forecast journals, calibration, and Brier scores

  • Score recorded binary forecasts without rewriting them after settlement.
  • Distinguish calibration from discrimination and profitability.
  • Recognize sample size, selection, and dependence limits in a forecast record.

A calibrated forecaster's 70% forecasts should resolve YES roughly 70% of the time across a sufficiently informative collection of comparable predictions. Calibration is a property of a collection, not an individual event. A 90% forecast that resolves NO is not automatically a bad forecast; persistent underestimation of the remaining 10% is. Keep time-stamped forecasts, definitions, revisions, and outcomes before calculating scores.

For binary outcomes y in {0, 1}, the Brier score is the mean of (p - y)². Lower is better, with 0 for perfect predictions and 1 for completely confident wrong predictions. Honest probabilities minimize expected Brier loss under the forecaster's belief. That does not mean a tiny observed score difference proves skill. Compare with a relevant baseline, such as an available base-rate forecast made with the same information, and study uncertainty rather than just a leaderboard.

Calibration asks whether stated frequencies match observed frequencies. Discrimination asks whether higher forecasts tend to identify the events that happen. A forecaster can be calibrated yet uninformative by assigning a suitable common base rate to everything. Profitability is a further question involving the available price, fees, execution, and size. Do not infer trading ability from a quiz score or a small, selected paper sample.

Your paper exercise

Create a frozen forecasting journal

  1. Invent ten questions with precise YES definitions, forecast dates, probabilities, and resolution dates.
  2. Assign synthetic outcomes only after freezing the probabilities. Calculate the mean Brier score.
  3. Compare with a 50% baseline and a second stated base-rate baseline on the same questions.
  4. Group the forecasts into broad probability bands. Discuss why ten observations are too few for a stable calibration curve and identify any common underlying events.
Learning check: A forecaster beats a baseline on four invented events. What can that result establish?

04Beginner · about 45 minutes

Read the contract before forecasting it

  • Extract the controlling question, deadline, timezone, and resolution source.
  • Distinguish real-world ambiguity from a contract's specified settlement procedure.
  • Model oracle, correction, cancellation, and dispute risk.

Your model must predict the event defined in the contract. Read the complete question and rulebook: what observation counts, which source controls, what time and timezone close the window, whether a first release or a revised value matters, and whether rounding changes the threshold. A headline such as 'above 100' leaves unanswered whether exactly 100 qualifies, which measurement is used, and whether a correction published later can change settlement.

An oracle is a mechanism that brings external facts into a settlement process. It might be an exchange's determination under its rules or a decentralized proposal and challenge procedure. Neither design removes the need to inspect who supplies evidence, who can object, what incentives apply, how long disputes take, and what exceptional outcomes are possible. The course does not assume that one venue's oracle or appeal rights apply to another.

Settlement risk belongs in the analysis even when your real-world forecast is excellent. Ambiguous wording, source outages, delayed publication, revisions, canceled events, and disputes can alter the payout or tie up paper capital longer than expected. A course summary cannot replace the controlling rulebook. Preserve its dated version and record uncertainties before assigning a probability.

Your paper exercise

Draft a contract audit card

  1. Write a synthetic contract with one threshold, one authoritative source, one observation time, and one timezone.
  2. Specify strict versus inclusive comparison, first versus revised publication, and rounding rules.
  3. Add hypothetical outage, postponement, cancellation, dispute, and finality procedures. Mark every procedure as invented.
  4. Give a second learner three borderline facts and compare settlement decisions. Rewrite any wording that produces disagreement.
Learning check: A first release is exactly 100; a contract requires the first release to be strictly greater than 100. What is the outcome under these synthetic rules?

05Intermediate · about 55 minutes

Spreads, depth, fees, slippage, and expected value

  • Distinguish the best bid, best ask, last trade, and available depth.
  • Calculate fee-adjusted expected value and weighted price across a synthetic ask book.
  • Recognize partial fills and why a static paper fill overstates execution certainty.

The bid is a quoted buying price and the ask is a quoted selling price. Their difference is the spread. Depth is the quantity offered at each price, not a promise that the quantity survives until an order arrives. A last-trade chart can be stale, while a midprice may lie between quotes where no immediate transaction is offered. Keep price freshness, bid and ask sides, and quantities explicit in every exercise.

For a synthetic YES unit paying $1 or $0, with your probability p, purchase price c, and fixed fee f paid per unit regardless of outcome, expected net per unit is p - c - f. For q units, multiply by q. Break-even probability is c + f, which can exceed 100%; do not clamp it into an apparently attainable forecast. Real fee schedules may depend on price, outcome, order type, or other terms and need their own verified calculation.

Walking an ask book increases the average cost when the cheapest depth is exhausted. Fees, queue position, cancellations, latency, adverse selection, and market movement create further differences between a displayed opportunity and a fill. A limit order can remain unfilled; an immediate order can use only the depth that actually exists. The calculator uses a frozen synthetic book, returns incomplete fills honestly, and cannot estimate live execution quality.

Your paper exercise

Challenge a displayed opportunity

  1. Invent an ascending ask book with three price levels and a finite quantity at each.
  2. Calculate average price for a small request, a larger request, and a request beyond total depth.
  3. Use a stated probability assumption and synthetic per-unit fee to calculate expected net at the achieved average price.
  4. Remove the cheapest level, add a higher fee, and lower your probability by five percentage points. Record which assumption changes the conclusion.
Learning check: Your probability is 56%, the price is $0.55, and a fixed synthetic fee is $0.02 per unit. What is expected net per unit?

06Intermediate · about 60 minutes

Correlation, drawdowns, and the limits of Kelly

  • Distinguish independent losses from several positions sharing one underlying risk.
  • Calculate compounded drawdown and the gain needed to recover.
  • Understand the analytical Kelly formula and why its assumptions are fragile.

Ten contracts are not ten independent risks if they all depend on one election, announcement, data release, or settlement source. Positive correlation can make losses cluster. Capital may also remain unavailable while events settle or disputes resolve. List exposure by underlying driver and by shared infrastructure failure, then stress simultaneous losses. Counting contract names is not a diversification analysis.

If a paper portfolio loses fraction r of its remaining capital on each of n consecutive losing exercises, the drawdown is 1 - (1 - r)^n. At r = 10% and n = 5, the loss is 40.951%, not 50%; the remaining capital is 59.049% of the start. Recovering a drawdown d requires a gain of d / (1 - d) on the remaining capital. Losing half requires doubling what remains. This arithmetic does not estimate the probability of a losing streak or guarantee that ruin is avoided.

For one idealized binary wager with total cost c per $1 unit, 0 < c < 1, probability p, and net win odds b = (1 - c) / c, expected log wealth is p ln(1 + bf) + (1 - p) ln(1 - f), where f is the fraction of capital exposed to a complete loss. The unconstrained Kelly optimum is f* = (pb - (1 - p)) / b = (p - c) / (1 - c). This is an analytical result under known probabilities, repeatability, and the assumed payoff and cost. It is not a recommended position size. Estimation error, correlated exposures, changing opportunities, capital locks, execution limits, and different preferences undermine those assumptions; a negative formula does not authorize shorting.

Your paper exercise

Map common shocks

  1. Create five invented contracts and label their common event, data source, and settlement infrastructure.
  2. Assign hypothetical paper allocations solely to compare scenarios; do not treat them as a proposed personal bankroll plan.
  3. Calculate a simultaneous common-shock loss and a sequence of shrinking-capital losses. Explain the difference.
  4. Derive the Kelly optimum on paper, perturb p by ±0.05, and list at least four assumptions that prevent the formula from becoming a personalized recommendation.
Learning check: What is the drawdown after five losses of 10% of remaining paper capital?

07Intermediate · about 60 minutes

Strategy hypotheses and honest backtests

  • Write a falsifiable hypothesis with an explicit information timestamp.
  • Detect look-ahead leakage, selection bias, and repeated testing.
  • Evaluate forecast quality and paper execution separately.

A hypothesis specifies why an observable signal could predict a defined event better than a relevant baseline. Record the signal, available timestamp, forecast rule, comparison, and criteria that would count against the idea before examining outcomes. 'Buy things that went up' is not a complete hypothesis; the information set, timing, costs, and failure conditions are missing. Make the initial research claim small enough to be disproved.

Look-ahead leakage occurs when a historical decision uses information that was unavailable at the decision time, including later revisions, final settlement text, future categories, or cleaned data published afterward. Survivorship and selection bias occur when vanished, canceled, illiquid, or losing markets disappear from the sample. Trying many variations and reporting only the winner turns random noise into apparent skill. Keep a record of all tested ideas and reserve genuinely untouched observations.

Split evaluation forward in time and separate related events across training and evaluation when necessary. Fit transformations on training data only. Use only data whose collection and research uses are permitted; a visible quote or downloadable API field is not an unrestricted license. Report assumptions about missing observations, executable prices, costs, partial fills, and capital locks. A paper backtest can support a research hypothesis under those assumptions, but cannot reproduce queue position, market impact, or actual obligations.

Your paper exercise

Pre-register a synthetic research test

  1. Write one hypothesis, one fixed forecast rule, one baseline, and a rejection condition before generating outcomes.
  2. Create a small synthetic table with forecast time, source publication time, and later revision time.
  3. Flag any feature that was unavailable at forecast time. Hold out the last time segment without tuning on it.
  4. Report forecast error separately from hypothetical fill-adjusted net. Include failed variations, missing observations, and assumptions.
Learning check: A backtest uses a value revised a week after the historical forecast time. What is the central problem?

08Intermediate · about 45 minutes

Market integrity, insider restrictions, and data ethics

  • Recognize manipulative activity and avoid making it a strategy hypothesis.
  • Treat nonpublic information, event influence, and role-specific restrictions as review triggers.
  • Separate public visibility, API access, redistribution rights, and AI-use permissions.

Market integrity is a prerequisite for learning from prices. Spoofed displayed interest, wash trading, misleading statements, coordinated distortion, and interference with an event or resolution process can damage that information. An apparent price anomaly is not permission to create one. This course studies how suspicious behavior degrades evidence and execution; it does not provide tactics for manipulation or evasion.

Inside information and conflicts require particular care in event markets. Rules may restrict people with material nonpublic information, influence over the event or settlement, or specified roles such as officials and participants. Applicable law and each venue's current rules need separate review. Do not infer that everything is permitted merely because a restriction familiar from securities markets has a different name or scope here. A course cannot provide legal clearance for a personal situation.

Data rights are equally specific. Permission to call an API can differ from permission to retain quotes, share them with third parties, republish them, train a model, or feed them into an AI service. Terms can impose attribution, retention, rate, commercial-use, and AI-use restrictions. This public course uses invented inputs; it must not ingest licensed venue quotes into an LLM or publish them without verified permission. Public factual descriptions can be sourced separately without building a redistributed market feed.

Your paper exercise

Create a data and integrity checklist

  1. For an invented research dataset, list collection, retention, analysis, AI input, redistribution, and display as separate uses.
  2. Mark the permission evidence needed for each use and leave unresolved items unresolved.
  3. Write a synthetic conflict scenario involving influence over an event. Identify why forecast quality cannot resolve the conflict.
  4. Describe how a paper study would exclude suspicious, improperly obtained, or unlicensed material while preserving a record of the exclusion.
Learning check: A public API responds successfully, but its terms restrict AI input and redistribution. Which conclusion follows?

09Advanced · about 65 minutes

Advanced execution architecture, simulated only

  • Explain a simulated order lifecycle and why intent differs from a confirmed fill.
  • Design validation, idempotency, reconciliation, and failure handling conceptually.
  • Identify the gap between a paper simulator and a live execution system.

A rigorous paper system separates permitted input data, a versioned forecast, a proposed paper action, pre-action checks, simulated matching, a position ledger, and reconciliation. Keep forecasts and execution assumptions distinct. A read-only concept diagram can show where a permitted public fact might enter, but this course does not create credentials, attach accounts, connect a wallet, or provide a live-order connector. No helper here can reach a venue.

Model order states explicitly: proposed, rejected, acknowledged, partially filled, filled, canceled, and unresolved. A request timeout means the status is unknown, not necessarily that nothing happened. Idempotency and durable intent identifiers prevent a retry from becoming a duplicate action; reconciliation compares recorded intentions, reported fills, positions, and cash. Out-of-order messages, stale snapshots, duplicate events, and cancel-fill races belong in a simulated failure exercise before any operational claim.

A static simulator cannot recreate queue priority, hidden liquidity, adverse selection, latency, venue downtime, market impact, real capital constraints, or legal and contractual obligations. Advanced study means making these limits explicit and testing accounting invariants, not declaring paper gains achievable. Conceptual controls include bounded inputs, permission checks, stale-data handling, audit trails, human review, and stopping when state cannot be reconciled. Their design is not authorization for autonomous trading.

Your paper exercise

Reconcile a synthetic event log

  1. Draw a paper-only data-flow diagram from synthetic inputs through a forecast, intent log, simulator, and position ledger.
  2. Write a 10-unit order story with a partial fill, timeout, duplicate reply, later fill, and cancellation.
  3. Assign stable IDs and timestamps. Reconcile filled plus canceled plus unresolved quantity with the original requested quantity.
  4. State which live effects the simulator omits and why no result from this exercise establishes executable returns.
Learning check: A request times out after submission in a conceptual execution system. What should the system assume?

10Advanced · about 65 minutes

Perpetuals: funding, leverage, and liquidation stress

  • Distinguish leveraged perpetual exposure from a bounded-payoff event unit.
  • Calculate synthetic long equity, funding costs, and a terminal maintenance test.
  • Explain path-dependent liquidation and how losses may exceed posted margin.

A perpetual derivative generally has no fixed expiry and uses mechanisms such as funding to support its relationship with an underlying reference. Funding may be paid or received and can change over time. Initial margin is collateral against a larger notional position; it is not the full size of the exposure. Mark-price rules, index composition, maintenance tiers, liquidation procedures, fees, and deficit treatment must be read for the exact product. An advertisement showing leverage proves none of those details or an individual's eligibility.

The synthetic calculator models one linear long held to a terminal observation. Initial notional N = collateral C × leverage L. For an underlying return m, P&L = N × m. Constant funding is N × (funding basis points / 10,000) × periods, charged on initial notional. Terminal equity is C + P&L - funding; terminal maintenance is ending notional × maintenance percentage. Equity at or below that threshold is flagged as a breach in this invented model. It does not calculate a real liquidation price, simulate early closing, or use any venue's margin engine.

Linear price P&L does not make leveraged risk simple. Funding, changing maintenance, gaps, forced liquidation, fees, and the inability to survive an adverse path can create discontinuous and path-dependent losses. A position that ends with positive equity may already have crossed maintenance and been closed earlier. During a gap or a failed close, losses can exceed posted collateral and an account may owe a deficit depending on the product and its rules. This chapter is a stress exercise, not evidence that the user has opted into or can access live perpetuals.

Your paper exercise

Stress the path as well as the endpoint

  1. Use invented collateral, leverage, maintenance percentage, and constant funding basis points. Label the position a synthetic long.
  2. Compare -5%, -10%, -12%, and -20% terminal moves. Record equity, maintenance, and any hypothetical deficit.
  3. Draw a path that falls sharply and then recovers to the same terminal price as a calm path. Explain why an endpoint calculator cannot establish survival.
  4. Change funding from a cost to a receipt, then add a larger cost. List which real product terms would be needed to assess liquidation and any obligation beyond collateral.
Learning check: Does positive terminal equity prove that a leveraged position could not have been liquidated earlier?

11Advanced · about 50 minutes

Read the 2026 landscape with an evidence matrix

  • Compare products and venues with dated primary evidence rather than brand associations.
  • Keep US and California access, global products, API approval, and data rights separate.
  • Identify which assertions remain unresolved and need a fresh official check.

A current venue comparison is an evidence matrix, not a ranking of where to trade. Each row needs the exact legal entity and product, contract type, governing rules, settlement process, geographic and individual eligibility, fee basis, API availability, production approval requirements, and data-use permissions. Date the evidence and distinguish a regulator record, binding terms, developer documentation, marketing, and your inference. An official source can answer only the questions it actually covers.

Treat global Polymarket and Polymarket US as separate product and eligibility reviews; one name does not transfer access conditions between them. For Kalshi, review the current contract rules, account requirements, API and data terms, regulator materials, and California-specific product disputes in the dated source ledger. A sports-contract legal proceeding does not automatically decide every non-sports contract, API permission, or person's access. Where production permission or AI/data rights are unresolved, keep the claim unresolved rather than replacing it with a yes.

Adjacent services belong in clearly labeled comparison rows. A crypto-routing API such as Jupiter raises software-license and data-use questions that are different from a blanket conclusion about every spot transaction. A paper environment such as Alpaca's is an infrastructure comparison, not evidence that it hosts the same event contracts. Recheck product advertising against official product pages and regulator records. A claim about the 'first US perpetuals exchange' needs an exact product definition, date, relevant authorization, and access terms before it becomes course fact.

Your paper exercise

Audit a dated venue row

  1. Use the accompanying official-source ledger to choose one product row; do not infer permission from its brand or advertisement.
  2. Record exact entity, product, source date, source type, claim supported, and claim not answered.
  3. Keep technical API availability, production approval, contractual data rights, legal status, and individual eligibility in separate cells.
  4. Mark unresolved issues and a recheck date. Describe a synthetic classroom alternative that remains usable without quotes, accounts, or production access.
Learning check: Official documentation confirms an API exists. Which additional statement is justified by that fact alone?

12Advanced · about 70 minutes

Conditional 2027 scenarios and a capstone

  • Describe conditional 2027 scenarios without presenting them as forecasts or facts.
  • Assign observable triggers, disconfirming evidence, and update dates to each scenario.
  • Integrate probability, settlement, execution, integrity, and permission analysis in a paper capstone.

Scenario 1: Broader regulated distribution. If more exchanges and brokers expose event contracts in 2027, access channels and product differences may become more important to study. Observable triggers: New CFTC registrations or designation amendments; Official broker and exchange notices; API releases and documented onboarding changes. Uncertainty: Hypothetical scenario, not a forecast. No probability assigned; it can coexist with restrictions and does not imply personal eligibility.

Scenario 2: Access fragments by state or contract category. If disputes and rule changes persist, 2027 access may vary more by state, sports versus other events, or user class. Observable triggers: Published court orders; State regulator notices; Venue rule changes or contract withdrawals; Current geolocation-policy changes. Uncertainty: No legal outcome is assumed. An allegation is not a judgment; a case in one state does not establish another state's rules.

Scenario 3: Data licensing becomes a larger constraint. If venues clarify or tighten redistribution, derived-data, retention, and AI terms, a technically working API may still be unsuitable for a public learning product. Observable triggers: Revised data terms; Published Market Data Agreements; Express AI or retention clauses; Written licensing permission for the intended use. Uncertainty: Future licensing terms are unknown. No permission for this course to ingest or redistribute live venue data has been obtained.

Scenario 4: Stronger integrity controls. If regulators and venues add controls in 2027, confidentiality duties, outcome influence, contract exclusions, and surveillance evidence may receive more attention. Observable triggers: Updated rulebooks; Regulator enforcement notices; Exchange disciplinary publications; New market-specific exclusions or government ethics rules. Uncertainty: The scope, timing, and effectiveness of future controls are unknown. Enforcement allegations must be labeled accurately.

Scenario 5: Liquidity changes unevenly. If activity expands or access contracts in 2027, popular markets may gain depth while obscure or disputed contracts become harder to exit. Observable triggers: Authorized observations of executable spread and depth; Fee-schedule changes; Market-maker notices; Trading suspensions or settlement delays. Uncertainty: No growth or deterioration is predicted. Volume and publicity are not proof of executable liquidity, and paper fills do not establish live performance.

Scenario 6: Perpetuals expand, or margin rules tighten. Additional asset-specific approvals and product launches could broaden perpetual offerings in 2027. Volatility events could also lead to stricter margin, access or liquidation rules; both paths can coexist. Observable triggers: New CFTC product approvals; filed contract specifications; official changes to funding, collateral, maintenance and access requirements. Uncertainty: Neither new assets nor stable leverage limits are assumed. Funding, deficit protections and retail availability may differ by account and product.

These six conditional cases may coexist. Check effective dates, appeals, source rights and the exact product and jurisdiction. None is a factual claim about what 2027 will bring, a price forecast, or a recommendation to deploy capital. A developer endpoint alone is weak evidence for research permission; a press release alone cannot establish a final operative legal outcome.

Your paper exercise

Complete the 2027 paper capstone

  1. Select one synthetic binary event and write its complete settlement and dispute rules.
  2. Record a base-rate prior, a Bayes update, a forecast timestamp, an uncertainty range, and a future scoring plan.
  3. Build a synthetic order book and fee schedule. Calculate expected net, partial-fill exposure, common-shock losses, and capital lock assumptions.
  4. Add a separate synthetic perpetual stress example and explain why its margin and path risks differ from the event contract.
  5. For each 2027 scenario, write one observable trigger, one disconfirming observation, a dated review plan, and the legal/data/API questions that remain separate.
  6. Produce a one-page research conclusion with assumptions, failure conditions, and paper limitations. Leave account creation, funding, credentials, and live orders outside the exercise.
Learning check: Which is the strongest form of a 2027 scenario statement?

Advanced concept / paper system only

Keep evidence, intent and accounting separate.

  1. Permitted evidenceSource, timestamp, rights
  2. Versioned forecastPrior, model, uncertainty
  3. Paper intentUnique ID, constraints
  4. Synthetic matchingPartial fills, stale book
  5. Position ledgerCash, cost, exposure
  6. ReconciliationDuplicates, races, unknown state
Reconcile each simulated event to the original intent. A timeout leaves state unknown; retrying as a new intent can double exposure. This diagram has no live connector.

02 / Practice without a position

The paper lab.

These inputs are hypothetical assumptions. No market feeds, account connection, order submission or strategy automation. Results illustrate a model and do not prove an executable edge.

A / Update a belief

Bayes, with a base rate.

Use P(evidence | YES) and P(evidence | NO), not P(YES | evidence).

Synthetic default: posterior 40.0%.

P(YES | E) = p × L₁ / [p × L₁ + (1 − p) × L₀]

B / Score forecasts

Confidence meets reality.

Enter one probability and binary outcome per line, separated by a comma. Use probabilities from 0 to 1; outcomes are 0 or 1.

Synthetic default: mean Brier 0.125; lower is better.

Binary Brier = mean[(probability − outcome)²]. Here 0–1; some sources use a two-category 0–2 scale. A tiny sample cannot establish calibration.

Synthetic data • 20 fictional events • Browser-only learning exercise

Confidence is measurable

This is a constructed teaching example, not Mantic or Polymarket data, not a real-world backtest, and not evidence of investment performance.

Choose a fictional forecaster

Matches the constructed group frequencies and gives more informative forecasts in this sample.

Mean Brier loss 0.1600 (lower is better). Binned ECE 0.0000 probability units (0.00 percentage points). n = 20; Yes = 10.
Observed sample calibrationMean predicted probability on the horizontal axis, observed Yes rate on the vertical axis. Both range from zero to one. Counts and exact values appear in the table below.011Mean forecast →Observed Yes rate →n=10n=10
Observed calibration in 20 fictional events. The diagonal is agreement, not a confidence interval. Zero sample ECE does not establish durable skill.
Five equal-width probability-of-Yes bins; empty bins have no observed rate
BinCountMean forecastObserved YesAbsolute gap
[0, 0.2)0———
[0.2, 0.4)100.20000.20000.0000
[0.4, 0.6)0———
[0.6, 0.8)0———
[0.8, 1]100.80000.80000.0000

ECE = Σ (bin count / n) × |mean forecast − observed Yes rate|. Lower is closer agreement in this sample. No invented uncertainty intervals; no fees, execution or return estimates.

Read the evaluation methods and Mantic study limits ↓

C / Count the costs

Belief minus all-in cost.

One invented YES contract pays $1 or $0. The fee is a fixed per-contract total cost assumption, not any venue’s fee schedule.

Synthetic default: EV +$3; YES +$43; NO −$57.

EV = quantity × (p − price − fee). Estimation error, slippage, delays and cash opportunity cost are additional assumptions.

D / Walk the book

The headline price has a size.

Invented asks: 20 at $0.50, 30 at $0.54, 50 at $0.60. Bid $0.48 means the best spread is $0.02. Fees are excluded here.

Synthetic default: 60 filled; average $0.5367; cost $32.20.

A snapshot assumes displayed size stays available. It cannot establish queue position, fills or a safe exit.

E / Survive a losing cluster

Drawdown compounds.

Assume each loss consumes the same fraction of remaining hypothetical capital. Linked events can create clustered losses.

Synthetic default: 65.1% drawdown; 34.9% remains.

Drawdown = 1 − (1 − fraction)ⁿ. This is a loss-path illustration, not a probability-of-ruin estimator or sizing recommendation.

F / Stress leverage

A margin cliff.

Synthetic linear long: constant entry notional; funding paid on that notional. Maintenance uses ending mark notional for teaching. Actual mark/index prices, fees, changing notional and liquidation rules differ.

Synthetic default: $6,100 notional; equity $66.70; below $259.25 maintenance assumption.

Equity = collateral + notional × move − funding. Linear P/L meets a threshold; forced exit, fees and gap risk create nonlinear account outcomes. A negative result means a possible deficit, not a capped loss.

Same $1,000 collateral, different path.

Invented 6.1× long, 30 total funding bps and 5% maintenance on ending notional. Terminal stresses below ignore earlier forced exit and fees; these are not executable holding outcomes.

Synthetic long position stress, not a venue liquidation calculator
Price moveEquity before exit costsMaintenance test
−5%$676.70Above assumed $289.75
−15%$66.70Below assumed $259.25
−20% gap−$238.30Possible deficit beyond collateral

Your research notebook

Write the assumptions first.

Keep personal account and financial information out of notes. This field stays in this page’s memory; download it before leaving. No note is sent or stored by this course.

Forecasting literacy · checked 2026-10-05

When forecasts meet markets: learn to measure the edge

A probability can be well calibrated, useful for a decision, and still say nothing about trading returns. Here is how to read a forecasting study without collapsing those questions into one.

Try the synthetic calibration example ↑

What the Mantic study reports

Mantic’s September 29, 2026 post reports 10,073 observations across 4,139 markets and 817 resolved events from February–August 2026, sampled at trading-volume milestones. Its forecasts could see contemporaneous market prices. It reports stronger Brier-score performance at lower volume and expected calibration error of 0.022 versus Polymarket’s 0.058 for questions with at least $1,000 traded. It also describes an ensemble tested on held-out events. The payoff exercise omits fees, market impact, and position sizing. These are vendor-reported retrospective findings, not independent validation or demonstrated repeatable profits. Because market prices are an input, the comparison tests added value beyond market information, rather than forecasting in isolation. PointCast has not reproduced the experiment. Read Mantic’s account.

Three different questions

Calibration asks whether probability statements match outcome frequencies over many forecasts. If a system repeatedly says 70%, roughly seven in ten comparable outcomes should occur over a sufficiently large, representative sample. One failed 70% forecast does not establish miscalibration. Accuracy asks how good the full probability predictions are against outcomes. Decision value asks whether using them improves a particular choice, given its costs and consequences.

A system that always predicts the overall base rate can be calibrated while missing important differences between situations. Good forecasting needs both reliable probabilities and useful separation of more-likely from less-likely outcomes. Research describes the related goal as sharp forecasts subject to calibration. Calibration and sharpness.

A score that rewards honest uncertainty

For a binary event, use Brier loss = (probability − outcome)², with outcome 1 for Yes and 0 for No. Average it across forecasts; lower is better. A 70% forecast scores 0.09 if Yes occurs and 0.49 if No occurs. An uninformative 50% forecast scores 0.25 either way. Here we use the single-event 0–1 convention; some categorical implementations sum both outcomes and double the number.

Brier loss is strictly proper: in expectation, your genuine probability estimate minimizes your loss. It evaluates more than correct-versus-incorrect labels, so 51% and 99% are meaningfully different commitments. Compare models on the same questions, timestamps, and weighting scheme. Proper scoring rules.

Read calibration charts with the sample size

A reliability chart groups similar probabilities and plots their average forecast against their observed Yes frequency. Points near the diagonal indicate agreement in that sample. A simple binned ECE averages each group’s absolute gap, weighted by its share of observations. Empty groups supply no evidence. Calibration evaluation.

ECE is an estimate, not a universal certificate. Bin boundaries, sample size, and estimator choices can change it; research documents bias in common binned estimators. Display counts and uncertainty, compare identical procedures, and inspect performance by topic and forecast horizon. A small headline number can conceal weak subgroups. Estimator bias.

The hard part is respecting the clock

A historical prompt does not make a modern model forget. Outcomes can leak through model training, updated web pages, retrieval ranking, surrounding text, or questions selected after resolution. A claimed training cutoff alone is not a complete audit. Freeze model versions, archive the information actually available at the forecast timestamp, and preserve retrieval records. These are general evaluation risks, not findings that any particular study leaked. Forecasting evaluation pitfalls.

Holdouts must also protect model selection: tuning prompts, filters, or ensemble weights after inspecting test results consumes the test. Our recommended design reserves a final chronological period and reports all prespecified comparisons, including disappointing ones.

Count independent information, not just rows

Several binary markets can belong to one underlying event, and repeated snapshots revisit the same question. Polymarket’s research guide explains this event–market structure. Treating every row as unrelated can exaggerate certainty. Market and event structure.

For an evaluation, group related markets by event when splitting data and estimating uncertainty. Show event-level results alongside observation-weighted averages. Report exclusions, unresolved questions, forecast horizons, and topic mix. These design recommendations help readers see whether an apparent advantage is broad or concentrated in a few shared outcomes.

Forecast skill is not a profit statement

A quoted probability does not specify an executable transaction. Order books contain separate bids, asks, and quantities; orders can fill only partly. Any trading-performance claim would need realistic prices, spread, depth, delays, applicable fees, and exposure constraints. Order-book fields, partial fills, and fee documentation.

PointCast’s exercise measures forecast quality only. Its fictional outcomes contain no investable signal, return estimate, trading instruction, or connection to an exchange.

The next convincing test happens before resolution

Forward benchmarks record predictions while the answers are still unknown; ForecastBench is one published example. ForecastBench.

Our proposed paper-forecast benchmark would preregister eligible questions, timestamps, scoring, exclusions, and the stop date. It would freeze system versions, record baseline probabilities at the same moment, distinguish market-informed from market-blind forecasts, and lock ensemble rules before evaluation. Publish every forecast and resolution with an audit trail, then assess Brier loss, calibration, topic stability, and event-clustered uncertainty. No trades are needed. A clean prospective result would answer a stronger question than another carefully tuned retrospective chart.

UES: a community-learning exercise

For a University of El Segundo community-learning session, start the synthetic lab with twenty fictional outcomes. Compare an always-50% forecaster, a 20%/80% forecaster, and a 5%/95% forecaster. Before revealing scores, predict which will do best. Explain why the first two can both show zero sample ECE while their Brier losses differ. Then alter one outcome and watch the chart move. Your conclusion should name the sample size and distinguish observed calibration from a durable forecasting skill.

IndustryNext: put the probability inside a decision

Use an explicitly fictional operations example: reserving backup capacity costs 20 units and prevents a 100-unit loss if disruption occurs. Under those simplified assumptions, the action becomes worthwhile above a 20% disruption probability. Real decisions need validated costs, effectiveness, timing, and uncertainty. Record the forecast, decision threshold, action, and outcome separately. That makes the learning question concrete: did better probability estimates improve planning, and when would more information have changed the choice?

Sources and claim limits · 11 primary sources
  1. Backtesting against Polymarket ↗Mantic · 2026-09-29

    Primary vendor account; not independently reproduced. The reported study summary only.

    Public post inspected; full report and underlying experiment not audited.
  2. Strictly Proper Scoring Rules, Prediction, and Estimation ↗Tilmann Gneiting and Adrian E. Raftery · 2007

    Primary methodological research. Proper scoring rules and Brier interpretation.

  3. Probabilistic forecasts, calibration and sharpness ↗Tilmann Gneiting, Fadoua Balabdaoui, and Adrian E. Raftery · 2007

    Primary methodological research. Calibration versus forecast concentration.

  4. Evaluating model calibration in classification ↗Juozas Vaicenavicius et al. · 2019

    Primary methodological research. Empirical probability calibration and evaluation caveats.

  5. Mitigating Bias in Calibration Error Estimation ↗Rebecca Roelofs, Nicholas Cain, Jonathon Shlens, and Michael C. Mozer · 2022

    Primary methodological research. Binned ECE estimator bias and binning choices.

  6. Pitfalls in Evaluating Language Model Forecasters ↗Daniel Paleka, Shashwat Goel, Jonas Geiping, and Florian Tramèr · 2025

    Primary research analysis. Temporal leakage, retrieval limitations, cutoff and extrapolation caveats.

  7. ForecastBench: A Dynamic Benchmark of AI Forecasting Capabilities ↗Ezra Karger et al. · 2024

    Primary benchmark paper. Prospective unresolved-question evaluation.

  8. Making Polymarket Exchange Data Accessible for Research ↗Polymarket Institute · 2026-07-24

    Official research documentation. Event and binary-market hierarchy.

  9. Get order book ↗Polymarket · checked 2026-10-05

    Official technical documentation. Bids, asks, price and available size.

  10. Limit Orders ↗Polymarket Help Center · 2026-04-20

    Official product documentation. Partial order execution.

  11. Trading Fees ↗Polymarket Help Center · 2026-07-10

    Official product documentation. Applicable fees exist and depend on market category; no fixed fee rate used here.

03 / Current landscape · checked 2026-10-03

Four different gates.

An API endpoint can exist while production approval, data rights, local law or account access remain unresolved. These selected venues illustrate different structures; this is not an exhaustive directory or a ranking.

  1. API availabilityDoes the documented interface exist?
  2. Contractual rightsMay this use, sharing and AI processing occur?
  3. Law and productWhich entity, contract and jurisdiction?
  4. Personal eligibilityAge, location, verification and permissions?

US exchange / event contracts + separate perpetual futures

Kalshi

CFTC-designated KalshiEX and registered Kalshi Klear perform different exchange and clearing functions. A specific BTC perpetual approval is verified; event-contract and perpetual mechanics remain separate.

Interface
Official Predictions and Perps documentation exists. This course calls neither interface.
Data and AI rights
Data Terms contain AI/ML and reuse restrictions. The Developer Agreement restricts third-party sharing without written permission; a public quote feed or LLM input is not authorized here.
US / California
Age, verification, location and conflict restrictions apply. Perpetuals require separate approval. California sports-contract and tribal-land litigation remains material; September Ninth Circuit opinions do not provide blanket statewide clearance. Later court actions and individual eligibility were not established.
Course use
Public regulator and rule references plus invented numerical examples. No market prices, descriptions or settlement dataset is imported.

US event-contract exchange

Polymarket US

QCX LLC d/b/a Polymarket US is listed as a designated contract market by the CFTC. Its USD event-contract product is separate from Polymarket International.

Interface
Official retail documentation describes a public read API without keys and an authenticated trading/account API. The retail path uses identity verification and the developer portal; institutional onboarding is a separate path.
Data and AI rights
Technical access does not grant reuse rights. App terms restrict data to personal, noncommercial use connected with trading; listed reuse requires express licensing. Institutional read-only access requires a Market Data Agreement. Public redistribution and AI-processing rights for this course have not been obtained.
US / California
Published terms require minimum age or the higher local threshold, legal permission, screening, and venue rules. They do not promise availability in any specific location. California-specific legal eligibility is unverified here; an API, app, or approved account does not settle every legal question.
Course use
Study publicly sourced product facts and contract concepts. Exercises use invented prices and do not call its API, create credentials, or place orders.

International crypto prediction product

Polymarket International

The international blockchain product is distinct from the US exchange and has its own access policies.

Interface
International API documentation includes geographic restrictions. The current table lists the United States as close-only on both frontend and API: new orders are restricted under that category.
Data and AI rights
A documented endpoint or publicly visible information does not establish permission to redistribute venue data or feed it to AI. No such permission was obtained for this course.
US / California
Do not treat the global product as a US trading route. Follow current restrictions and do not bypass them through VPNs, alternate endpoints, or other workarounds. This policy is separate from Polymarket US eligibility.
Course use
Learn why product, entity, geography, and resolution rules must be identified precisely. No global quotes or wallet integration are used.

Beta Solana prediction infrastructure

Jupiter Prediction Market API

Official documentation describes a beta API for binary prediction markets on Solana. Beta interfaces may change.

Interface
The prediction API is publicly documented, but its geographical-restrictions section currently restricts United States and South Korea IP access.
Data and AI rights
The API/SDK license includes development, sharing, attribution, and use restrictions and incorporates separate Terms of Use. A proposed data or AI integration needs permission for its exact use; none was obtained here.
US / California
The prediction API's US restriction and incorporated locality terms are product or contractual conditions. They are not a statute proving a blanket legal ban on ordinary token spot swaps.
Course use
Compare architecture and contractual permission conceptually. No API calls, live quotes, wallets, unsigned transactions, or signatures are used.

Adjacent securities and crypto simulation

Alpaca paper environment

Alpaca documents simulated securities and crypto execution. This research does not establish it as a prediction-market venue.

Interface
Its paper environment simulates fills rather than sending orders to a live exchange. The course teaches only the general idea of a separate paper environment.
Data and AI rights
Paper-only accounts have a specified IEX data entitlement; published API access does not authorize the course to republish live market data. No Alpaca data is used.
US / California
No account creation or live brokerage eligibility is implied. Alpaca's paper availability does not establish prediction-market access or legal eligibility.
Course use
Use its published omissions to understand paper limits: impact, queue position, latency slippage, information leakage, and some fees are absent; simulated fills need not respect displayed liquidity. All course calculations remain synthetic.

This snapshot does not clear anyone to trade. Recheck the current named legal entity, product rules, fee schedule, current court orders, location restrictions and account requirements before any separate decision. Course downloads contain synthetic examples and public source references, not licensed venue prices.

04 / Explicit scenarios · 2027

Watch the triggers.
Keep the uncertainty.

These are editorial scenarios, not predictions or assigned probabilities. Several can occur together. Observations may support, weaken or change them; none establishes future access, liquidity or returns.

01

Broader regulated distribution

If more exchanges and brokers expose event contracts in 2027, access channels and product differences may become more important to study.

Observable triggers
New CFTC registrations or designation amendments; Official broker and exchange notices; API releases and documented onboarding changes.
What remains uncertain
Hypothetical scenario, not a forecast. No probability assigned; it can coexist with restrictions and does not imply personal eligibility.
Paper-study response
Compare two invented contract specifications and reconstruct a paper fill from a synthetic book, including fees and stale data.
02

Access fragments by state or contract category

If disputes and rule changes persist, 2027 access may vary more by state, sports versus other events, or user class.

Observable triggers
Published court orders; State regulator notices; Venue rule changes or contract withdrawals; Current geolocation-policy changes.
What remains uncertain
No legal outcome is assumed. An allegation is not a judgment; a case in one state does not establish another state's rules.
Paper-study response
Build a dated source checklist for an invented venue and keep technical access, contract rights, law, and user eligibility in separate columns.
03

Data licensing becomes a larger constraint

If venues clarify or tighten redistribution, derived-data, retention, and AI terms, a technically working API may still be unsuitable for a public learning product.

Observable triggers
Revised data terms; Published Market Data Agreements; Express AI or retention clauses; Written licensing permission for the intended use.
What remains uncertain
Future licensing terms are unknown. No permission for this course to ingest or redistribute live venue data has been obtained.
Paper-study response
Create a provenance and license register for synthetic records; identify which proposed uses would need explicit permission.
04

Stronger integrity controls

If regulators and venues add controls in 2027, confidentiality duties, outcome influence, contract exclusions, and surveillance evidence may receive more attention.

Observable triggers
Updated rulebooks; Regulator enforcement notices; Exchange disciplinary publications; New market-specific exclusions or government ethics rules.
What remains uncertain
The scope, timing, and effectiveness of future controls are unknown. Enforcement allegations must be labeled accurately.
Paper-study response
For three invented research hypotheses, document information provenance, confidentiality duties, influence over outcomes, and reasons to abstain.
05

Liquidity changes unevenly

If activity expands or access contracts in 2027, popular markets may gain depth while obscure or disputed contracts become harder to exit.

Observable triggers
Authorized observations of executable spread and depth; Fee-schedule changes; Market-maker notices; Trading suspensions or settlement delays.
What remains uncertain
No growth or deterioration is predicted. Volume and publicity are not proof of executable liquidity, and paper fills do not establish live performance.
Paper-study response
Stress an invented position with a shallow book, partial fills, larger fees, correlated losses, delayed settlement, and no available exit.
06

Perpetuals expand, or margin rules tighten

Additional asset-specific approvals and product launches could broaden perpetual offerings in 2027. Volatility events could also lead to stricter margin, access or liquidation rules; both paths can coexist.

Observable triggers
New CFTC product approvals; filed contract specifications; official changes to funding, collateral, maintenance and access requirements.
What remains uncertain
Neither new assets nor stable leverage limits are assumed. Funding, deficit protections and retail availability may differ by account and product.
Paper-study response
Repeat the synthetic stress with higher maintenance, changing funding signs, a price gap and forced-exit costs. Identify which assumptions a static terminal calculation cannot test.

05 / Follow the evidence

A dated source shelf.

Official product documents, terms and regulator material underpin the venue notes. Synthetic math and scenario design are original educational models. A checked date records this review, not a promise that a page or rule will stay unchanged.

The JSON route is a static, read-only research packet. It does not connect to a venue API. Downloaded learning checks include answer explanations.

  1. Strictly Proper Scoring Rules, Prediction, and Estimation ↗Gneiting & Raftery / JASA, 2007 · checked 2026-10-03

    Proper scoring encourages honest probability forecasts; calibration and sharpness are separate aspects of forecast evaluation.

    The lab uses the binary mean-squared-error convention, scaled 0–1. This is not a profit measure.
  2. Basics of Futures Trading ↗CFTC · checked 2026-10-03

    Futures, margin and leverage require risk awareness; derivative losses can exceed the amount initially committed.

    General education; not approval of a venue, product or person.
  3. BTCPERP futures approval · May 29, 2026 ↗CFTC · checked 2026-10-03

    The Commission approved KalshiEX’s bitcoin-referencing BTCPERP for listing as a futures contract, subject to compliance.

    Product-specific approval does not prove historical US-first status or personal eligibility.
  4. Predictions and Perps API documentation ↗Kalshi · checked 2026-10-03

    Official documentation separates event-contract interfaces from perpetual-futures and margin interfaces.

    Technical documentation is not a license for public data sharing or AI processing. No API was called.
  5. Perpetual futures, explained ↗Kalshi · checked 2026-10-03

    Company documentation describes leverage, funding and liquidation; leverage limits can change and a negative balance may be owed.

    Company’s US-first claim is not independently established. Deficit descriptions differ from its liquidation help page.
  6. KalshiEX DCM registry ↗CFTC · checked 2026-10-03

    KalshiEX is a designated contract market. Exchange designation is distinct from contract approval and clearing.

    Registration does not settle every state or tribal legal question.
  7. Kalshi Klear DCO registry ↗CFTC · checked 2026-10-03

    Kalshi Klear is a registered clearing organization; clearing and exchange functions are distinct.

    Margined retail access also involves intermediaries and account-specific requirements.
  8. Applying for Perpetuals Access ↗Kalshi Help Center · checked 2026-10-03

    Perpetual access involves US-based verification, a separate application, review and mandatory tutorial.

    No learner’s access was checked; product access is not automatic.
  9. Signing Up as an Individual ↗Kalshi Help Center · checked 2026-10-03

    Age and identity verification requirements and location restrictions apply.

    Does not establish blanket California sports access.
  10. How Funding Works ↗Kalshi Help Center · checked 2026-10-03

    Funding transfers between opposite positions; its sign determines which side pays. It differs from trading fees.

    All course rates and periods are invented. Current parameters must be rechecked.
  11. How Margin Works ↗Kalshi Help Center · checked 2026-10-03

    Initial, maintenance and variation margin differ; ongoing mark-to-market settlement coexists with no fixed expiry.

    The paper model is not this margin engine.
  12. Understanding Liquidation ↗Kalshi Help Center · checked 2026-10-03

    Maintenance breaches can trigger liquidation; this page describes isolated deficits being absorbed by a risk waterfall.

    Apparently different scope from the customer-liability warning in the perpetuals learn page. No guaranteed loss cap is inferred.
  13. Data Terms of Use ↗Kalshi · checked 2026-10-03

    Data terms restrict redistribution, software/data reuse and AI/ML processing; public visibility is not unrestricted permission.

    No written educational data/AI license was obtained. Course uses synthetic data and public source references.
  14. API Developer Agreement v1.1 ↗Kalshi · checked 2026-10-03

    API use is scoped to a member’s own trading; third-party data sharing requires written authorization.

    Endpoint availability does not authorize a course feed. No API agreement was accepted.
  15. Blue Lake Rancheria v. Kalshi · Sept 16, 2026 ↗US Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit · checked 2026-10-03

    In preliminary proceedings, the panel found tribes likely to succeed on IGRA claims about sports contracts accessed on tribal lands and remanded remaining injunction factors.

    Not a final statewide California prohibition. Subsequent stays, mandates and remand orders were not verified.
  16. KalshiEX v. Assad · Aug 28, 2026 ↗US Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit · checked 2026-10-03

    Nevada litigation: the panel affirmed dissolution of preliminary protection for sports contracts on the preemption showing, with partial remand.

    Nevada remedy is not a California-wide ban; later docket actions unverified.
  17. California joins defense of state gambling laws · June 12, 2026 ↗California Attorney General · checked 2026-10-03

    California’s amicus position supports state gambling-law authority in litigation involving other states.

    A litigating position is not a California court order or final legal determination.
  18. Source agency and trading prohibitions ↗Kalshi · checked 2026-10-03

    Restrictions cover source-agency employees, material nonpublic information and the ability to influence contract outcomes.

    Read current contract-specific rules; the course does not infer permissions for any profession or learner.
  19. CFTC designated contract market record: QCX LLC d/b/a Polymarket US ↗Commodity Futures Trading Commission · checked 2026-10-03

    Federal designated status; Legal entity and assumed name.

    Registration does not establish individual eligibility, every state's access rules, contract availability, or data reuse rights.
  20. What is Polymarket US? ↗Polymarket US · checked 2026-10-03

    Separate international and US products; US dollar event-contract product.

    Venue descriptions of compliance or price accuracy are not independent California legal clearance or guarantees of executable prices.
  21. Polymarket US API introduction ↗Polymarket US · checked 2026-10-03

    Official retail API exists; Public read endpoints and authenticated trading/account endpoints differ.

    Technical access and display documentation do not supersede terms or grant this course redistribution or AI rights.
  22. Polymarket US retail API authentication ↗Polymarket US · checked 2026-10-03

    Identity verification and approval for authenticated retail access; Official developer portal.

    No account, key, or approval for a production integration was obtained. Public API existence is a verified fact, while project permissions remain unresolved.
  23. Polymarket Exchange institutional onboarding ↗Polymarket US · checked 2026-10-03

    Institutional agreement and review route; Individual traders are directed to retail documentation.

    Do not apply institutional onboarding requirements universally to retail users. No institutional agreement was obtained.
  24. Polymarket US read-only data onboarding ↗Polymarket US · checked 2026-10-03

    Market Data Agreement; Reviewed read-only credentials and scopes.

    The agreement was not obtained. AI use, retention, derived works, and public redistribution rights remain unresolved. Read scopes are not reuse licenses.
  25. Polymarket App terms and conditions ↗PM US Tech · checked 2026-10-03

    ISV front end and controlling exchange documents; Local eligibility conditions; Personal noncommercial data-use limits and express licensing for reuse.

    Effective September 25, 2025; read in the official embedded document through the browser. No specific AI ban or California legal approval is established; exact reuse rights need express permission.
  26. Polymarket US Rulebook ↗Polymarket US · checked 2026-10-03

    Individual participant requirements; Application approval conditions; Participant conduct and outcome-review framework.

    Cover dated September 30, 2026. The latest URL changes over time. No California-specific clearance found; public-data posting does not grant unrestricted reuse.
  27. Polymarket International geographic restrictions ↗Polymarket · checked 2026-10-03

    US listed as close-only on frontend and API; Separate complete-block, close-only, and frontend-only categories.

    This is an international product policy, separate from the US product and from a legal opinion. Do not imply circumvention is permitted.
  28. Polymarket US market integrity policy ↗Polymarket US · checked 2026-10-03

    Confidential-information misuse restrictions; Outcome-influence and manipulation restrictions; Rulebook and enforcement references.

    Surveillance policies do not guarantee unbiased prices. Individual contracts and applicable law may add restrictions.
  29. New York announces lawsuit against Polymarket US ↗New York State Governor and Attorney General · checked 2026-10-03

    September 24, 2026 state litigation announcement; Continuing need to track state and contract-specific access.

    The announcement describes allegations and requested relief, not a final judgment. It does not establish California restrictions or a nationwide outcome.
  30. CFTC Enforcement Division prediction-markets advisory ↗Commodity Futures Trading Commission · checked 2026-10-03

    February 25, 2026 advisory; Confidential-information misuse, manipulation and disruptive-trading concerns; DCM surveillance duties.

    Accurately attribute specific venue findings and potential statutory violations; this source does not clear a trading strategy.
  31. Jupiter Prediction Market API ↗Jupiter · checked 2026-10-03

    Beta binary prediction-market API on Solana; United States and South Korea IP restriction.

    Product-specific access policy, subject to change. This does not prove a general statutory prohibition on token spot swaps.
  32. Jupiter SDK and API License Agreement ↗Jupiter · checked 2026-10-03

    Limited development license; API/content sharing restrictions; Attribution and use conditions; Incorporated terms.

    Contractual limits are distinct from law. The swap-framed license and newer prediction product leave exact integration scope questions requiring written permission.
  33. Jupiter Terms of Use ↗Jupiter · checked 2026-10-03

    Incorporated locality restrictions; US-resident or located wallets in prohibited localities; Anti-circumvention conditions.

    Interface or contractual policy does not establish a blanket legal ban on all digital-asset transactions. Accessible software does not imply contractual permission.
  34. Alpaca paper trading documentation ↗Alpaca · checked 2026-10-03

    Simulated execution without exchange routing; Documented paper omissions; Simulated quantity need not respect real liquidity; Paper-only IEX data entitlement.

    Adjacent securities/crypto simulation example, not a verified prediction-market venue. No live data reuse rights or account eligibility are implied.